For this Assignment, you will conduct your own search to find one diversity theory (Critical race theory) . Then you will describe how the critical race theory impacts the way you view diversity, inclusion, and equity, as well as your ongoing research for the DSW capstone project.
Submit a 2- to 3-page paper that addresses the following:
APA FORMAT: Every bullet bolded in black needs a header. A conclusion of the entire paper at the end. Reference page APA FORMAT. All information provided needs to be included throughout the paper.
I Choose Critical Theory because it would be useful with trying to understand mental health in the prison system and the role of diversity in the prison system.
Victims’ Rights and Public Safety
Online citation: Beck, Julie A. 2010. "Victims’ Rights and Public Safety? Unmasking Racial Politics in Crime Discourses Surrounding Parole Revocation for “Lifers” in California." Western Criminology Review 11(1):20-36. (http://wcr.sonoma.edu/v11n1/Beck.pdf).
Victims’ Rights and Public Safety? Unmasking Racial Politics in Crime Discourses Surrounding Parole Revocation for
“Lifers” in California
Julie A. Beck California State University, East Bay
Abstract: This paper reports on an intensive day-long symposium on Proposition 9 (also called the Victims’ Bill of Rights Act, or Marsy’s Law) held inside San Quentin, a maximum security prison for men in Northern California. This new law essentially ends parole for inmates serving terms of 25-years-to-life by extending the wait time between a parole denial and a new hearing to fifteen years. Its sponsors have framed it as a victims’ rights bill. This paper adopts a race, gender, and critical criminology perspective to challenge dominant criminal justice language and common-sense discourse such as “victims’ rights,” “public safety,” and “equality.” Dominant framings in criminal justice are deconstructed and their multiple meanings are explored from the position of diverse actors gathered at the prison symposium —Proposition 9 proponents, prisoners, crime victims, and prisoner-rights advocates. The paper argues that rather than protecting crime victims and promoting public safety (claims by Proposition 9 proponents) power and inequality inhere in mainstream criminal justice language whose dominant discursive framings mask a racial agenda and engender new forms of victimization—that of prisoners and their families. Politicized criminal justice talk surrounding “victims’ rights,” and the specific dichotomies it produces, ultimately denies rights and endangers the public by indefinitely removing parole-eligible “lifers’ from their communities.
Keywords: critical criminology; prisons; race; gender; discourse analysis; critical race theory; social control; critical legal theory; victims’ rights; Marsy’s Law
INTRODUCTION “The law does not passively adjudicate questions of social power; rather the law is an active instance of the very power politics it purports to avoid and stand above.” (Crenshaw, 1995:xxiv)
This paper analyzes how rights discourses and
mainstream criminal justice language, captured in commonsense concepts such as “victims,” “criminals,” and “public safety,” have helped to make California one of the most punitive states in the nation. The Victims’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008 (also called Marsy’s Law, or Proposition 9) vastly changes the way persons in prison
serving life terms with the possibility of parole, are considered for parole. The severity of this new law is perhaps most clearly seen in its presumption of a fifteen- year “wait period” between parole hearings, as opposed to the usual one-year wait period, for inmates who are denied parole.1 Opponents of the Law argue that this amounts to an additional prison sentence. The following is an analysis of how The Victims’ Bill of Rights Act claims to uphold equal rights and protections for California citizens—and for particular citizens. But this paper is not about the law, nor is it an instrumentalist critique of law’s racially biased outcomes. Rather, it is about how laws in the liberal legalist tradition, and about how criminal justice language, construct and are constitutive of unequal social relations.
Beck/ Western Criminology Review 11(1), 20-36 (2010)
My main argument is that the justice language employed to frame the issue of crime by proponents of Proposition 9 masks and embodies racial, gender, and class power. Commonsense notions about crime, victims, and public safety belie the inherent power relations they represent and bolster a political agenda that reinforces white privilege and serves the function of excluding those not privileged. I seek to show how the Victims’ Bill of Rights Act and Proposition 9 proponents have actively appropriated the very rights discourse used in the past by socially oppressed groups, and in so doing, reify white privilege into law. This paper asks: (i) who is being protected from whom through the Victims’ Bill of Rights Act, (ii) who are the “victims,” (iii) who are the perpetrators, and most of all, (iv) whose rights are at stake? I accomplish this analysis through a report on an unusual event — a deeply emotionally charged, day-long symposium on Proposition 9 held inside San Quentin prison, a maximum security prison for men in Northern California. I was invited to the event, held in October 2008, as a scholar and prison activist, one month before Californians voted to approve Proposition 9 by a 54% majority.2 The Prison University Project3 sponsored this symposium, which was structured as a panel discussion- debate with outside guests and prisoners freely participating.
I deconstructed the criminal justice language and the discourse surrounding the Victims’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008 using a discourse analysis of what was said during the seven-hour long symposium, and a textual analysis of campaign literature.4 In this discussion of how both proponents and opponents of Proposition 9 employed criminal justice discourse, I intend to demonstrate how The Victims’ Bill of Rights Act, rather than an example of the neutral adjudication of interpersonal conflict between two parties—“victims” and “criminals”—represents the “active instance” of social power relations (Crenshaw 1995) and specifically masks racial power. I take a deconstructionist approach to make three main theoretical points: (1) the commonsense justice language of mainstream criminology relies on linguistic polarities, what I am calling antagonistic dichotomies, which, bolstered by liberal legalist discourse, are embedded in power relations; (2) racial and gendered power relations, found in the victim identity in particular, are associated with these antagonist dichotomies; and (3) “victims’ rights,” as a concept and as a movement, shadows other types of victimization and appropriates rights discourses in a way that reproduces power and privilege, a process I am calling rights reversals.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE LANGUAGE: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND ARGUMENTS
My theoretical approach incorporates an explicit analysis of power by framing this discussion within critical criminological, race, and feminist scholarship. I am primarily interested in exploring how both mainstream criminal justice language and liberal legal discourses masquerade as commonsense and neutral but mask power. As Raymond Michalowski (2009) reminds us, critical criminology is a critique of power—of laws and justice practices and language, and how they reproduce domination. In taking a critical criminology perspective, in which laws are seen as created by those who have power (Black 1976; Chambliss 1999; Chambliss and Seidman 1971). My aim is to broaden orthodox criminology’s focus on interpersonal-harms to include an exploration of the state’s social harms/punitive crime policy. While appearing to empower (particular) crime victims, such policy, in fact, serves the interests of, and empowers, the state. In turn, all citizens, whether inside or outside the prison walls, are harmed by a state committed to punishment over social welfare (Arrigo and Milovanovic, 2009). While I focus on language and rights discourse (specifically “victims’ rights”), I also place the Victims’ Bill of Rights Act within the broader social and political context of the “get-tough-on-crime” movement of the last four decades (see, for example, Beckett 1997; Feeley and Simon 1992; Simon and Feeley 2003). In this sense, the Victims’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008 (hereafter referred to as the VBRA) can also be understood to be an extension of determinate sentencing and other mandatory sentencing schemes in today’s era of mass imprisonment, and thus, is part of an increasingly punitive state apparatus.5
There is a considerable body of sociolinguistic scholarship as well as cross-disciplinary work on how language functions to construct the everyday reality we take for granted. Language, including legal and justice language, is embedded with meanings; it already embodies that which it pretends to be merely describing (see for example Beckett 1997; Coyle 2002; Fowler, Kress, Trew, and Hodge 1979; Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, and Roberts 1979; Henry and Milovanovic 1996, 1999; Wood 1999, 2005). For instance, commonsense notions such as “crime victim” or “innocent victim” imply their opposite— a “guilty,” “criminal,” “perpetrator” (Coyle 2002), and idealized victims also imply less worthy or ignored victims (Wood 2005). Here I ask how criminal justice language and liberal legalist discourse produce social and racial/gender power relations through specific antagonistic dichotomies.
My overriding arguments about crime discourse rely on the feminist scholarship on intersectionality (Crenshaw 1995; Matsuda 1996). For example, Mari Matsuda (1996:64) encourages us to “ask the other question” such
Victims’ Rights and Public Safety
that race and racism require an analysis of gender, social class, and other oppressions. Feminist legal scholars and cultural historians address how constructions of crime and crime victims draw on long-held American ideologies of the Black criminal and the protection of white women by white men within patriarchal social and legal institutions (Morrison 1993; Roberts 1997; Stabile 2006; Wood 1999, 2005). Foucault’s (1977) critique of power-knowledge, whereby discursive power produces new social subjects who can be dominated, is also useful in order to understand how “crime victim” might constitute a new identity, one that reproduces unequal power relations. For example, I suggest that the Proposition 9 campaign and the VBRA reproduce and strengthen the victim identity: this new social subject, the “crime victim,” in making claims to rights (“victims’ rights”), in turn ironically denies and “reverses” the rights of others, in this case, those of California prisoners. The VBRA proponents use rights claims (“victims’ rights”) to deny the rights of prisoners by appropriating those very rights discourses traditionally used by oppressed groups in struggles for equality; hence the concept of rights reversal.
Much of my analysis centers on how Critical Legal Studies (CLS) intervened into the liberal legalist tradition, which views law as an apolitical mediator of social conflict. CLS draws connections between law, power, and white supremacy (white domination within the social, legal and cultural spheres) illustrating how racial power operates within legal discourses (Crenshaw 1995; Harris 1995). Critical Race Theory, similarly, asks how laws are a constitutive element of race itself, how law both historically constructed race, “and shapes and is shaped by race relations” today (Crenshaw 1995:xxiv). At the prison symposium, race was, indeed, the elephant in the room: it was never mentioned neither by the advocates of the VBRA nor by the prisoners (all of the former were white, while the vast majority of the latter was Black or Latino).6 However, I am suggesting that race was ever present in the terms and tropes: “victims,” “innocence,” “criminals,” “safety,” and “rights,” which disguised power and white supremacy.
Overall, I argue that criminal justice language sets up what I am calling antagonist dichotomies, which function as mutually exclusive categories. Through such polarities (for example, “victim” implies “criminal,” “victims’ rights” implies the lack of rights for “criminals” who are deemed unworthy of rights or protections), I seek to explore how mainstream justice language concepts are diametrically opposed, and without the possibility of reconciliation between seemingly autonomous entities. I claim that the dichotomies produced through criminal justice language are antagonistic because they function to exclude, and they derive from, and reproduce, explicit kinds of domination. Furthermore, I argue that these antagonistic dichotomies also constitute the very foundation of orthodox criminology and ameliorative
justice’s focus on interpersonal harms. That is, antagonistic dichotomies—victim/criminal, public safety/danger—are embedded in mainstream justice language and appear to fuel methodological individualism, the interpersonal-harms focus of orthodox criminology.
This paper is organized into three sections. In the first section I explore the antagonistic dichotomies embedded in mainstream criminal justice language. In the second section I focus on the construction of the “crime victim” identity, and specific racial meanings of the concept of “innocent victim.” I also include a discussion of rights discourses within liberal democratic states showing how groups who hold power use claims to rights to maintained class and racial inequality. In the third section, I give voice to the San Quentin prisoners and other opponents of the Victims’ Bill of Rights Act, illustrating how they challenge and disrupt commonsense criminal justice discourse and its underlying tensions and dichotomies. The prisoners reframed the crime issue by focusing on the state’s social harms, and complicated and reconstructed concepts of “victim,” “criminal,” “merit,” “rights,” and “public safety.”
MAINSTREAM CRIME TALK AND ANTAGONISTIC LANGUAGE DICHOTOMIES
Approximately 50 individuals, myself included, filed into the San Quentin prison chapel: half were prisoners themselves, “lifers” serving terms of 25-years-to-life with the possibility of parole, and the other half, invited outside speakers and guests. The latter included several proponents of Proposition 9 as well as opponents of the bill, mostly activists, prison lawyers, and academics.7 The debate that followed played out as an excruciatingly tense exercise in opposites: commonsense, everyday justice language used by the proponents of the VBRA was marked by seemingly irreconcilable dichotomies, for example, victim/criminal, innocence/guilt, public safety/danger.
The extreme polarity of positions taken between proponents and opponents of Proposition 9, The Victims’ Bill of Rights Act, and the difficulty of adequately articulating a response, left many of us feeling battered and worn. We lacked words for what felt intrinsically unjust about the proposed VBRA. At the core of the debate was the proponents’ claims to rights as crime victims and the fundamental tension between orthodox and critical criminology—that is, the personal-harms versus social- harms focus of each side, which fueled the debate over this new law. Michalowski (2009) states,
Whereas mainstream criminology’s focus is on interpersonal aspects of crime, critical criminology explores the states’ social harms. While the ameliorative model relies on
Beck/ Western Criminology Review 11(1), 20-36 (2010)
determining individual motivations, etc. critical criminologists ask the larger question of what constitutes crime.
Normative or orthodox criminology is characterized by legal formalism, such that only acts designated by law are objects of formal legal study. It supports an ameliorative justice model, which only adjudicates interpersonal harms, rather than addressing harms and crimes that are committed by the state (including those inflicted by punitive crime policy) or by institutions upon communities. In the ameliorative justice model the entire focus is on mens rea, or individual intention, with regard to crime (Michalowski 2009). Social and community harms perpetuated by the state and by institutions are omitted from mainstream criminological discourse. In the case of the VBRA, victims’ rights groups presented themselves as merely upholding the individual rights of crime victims—the right to protection against individual perpetrators of violent crime. Nowhere in their discourse was there mention or acknowledgement of potential unfair and unequal effects of this law, or the injustice it could incur for certain communities, let alone of broader social causes of crime. The exclusive focus of Proposition 9/VBRA proponents on interpersonal harms or ameliorative justice is founded on, and bolstered by, the victim/criminal dichotomy and claims to rights. Consider the following statements made by the VBRA proponents (emphases added):
• “This bill only goes after those who show no remorse.” (Mitch Zak, Yes on Proposition 9 Campaign P.R. Manager, 2008)
• “Proposition 9 is simply about giving more rights to
victims…it puts the constitutional rights of crime victims on an equal playing field with those of defendants.” (Mitch Zak, Yes on Proposition 9 Campaign, 2008)
• “[Proposition 9] prohibits early release policies, so
we won’t forfeit public safety by reducing overcrowding.” (Belinda Harris-Ritter, crime victim and attorney, 2008)
These statements reveal the operation of antagonist
dichotomies within justice language. The crime issue becomes reduced within the ameliorative justice framework to a matter of interpersonal harms, where rights claims hold a central place. The commonsense, criminal justice buzz-words: “lack of remorse,” “victims’ rights,” and “public safety,” together with liberalist legal discourse about the “equal playing field,” are used to justify claims to rights, and provide the vehicles through which crime victims reduce the terms of debate to a matter of interpersonal wrongs which must be righted. The claim
that inmates have “no remorse” sets up a strongly antagonistic dichotomy between the victim and the (remorseless) offender who, apparently due to an inability to feel empathy, assumes a monstrous identity.
The Proposition 9/VBRA’s proponents, whose specific language choices strengthen the focus on interpersonal harms and ameliorative justice, have set up three principle polarities through which they frame the crime issue. Table 1, below, shows how VBRA proponents’ justice-language claims reduce the complex issue of crime and harm to what I am calling antagonist dichotomizes; that is, irreconcilable polarities, which rationalize an even more punitive response to crime. Table 1. Individual Harms: Antagonistic Dichotomies
Individual Harms: Antagonistic Dichotomies Victims vs. Victimizers Safety vs. Danger Innocence vs. Guilt
Proposition 9 Increases public safety and decreases public danger
These language choices function dialectically such that victim/victimizer are reduced and reified into polar opposites, as are notions of safety/danger, equal rights/unequal access to rights, and so on. Moreover, these sets of antagonist conceptual dichotomies imply the impossibility of reconciliation. It would appear that victim status within the ameliorative justice/individual-harms model encourages and even necessitates polarization of identities and inherent antagonisms. For example, the “crime victim” is rendered his or her victim status through the way in which “victim” conceptually constructs its opposite (the “criminal,” who is assumed to be violent) such that victim and victimizer become calcified into diametrically opposing positions. The crime victim’s demands for justice in the form of ever harsher punishment, in turn, seems reasonable, even expected: they are inherently justified through the oppositional constructions of “victims’ rights/remorseless criminals,” innocence/guilt, and “safety/danger.” Significantly, these victim/criminal, innocence/guilt, safety/danger dichotomies carry an implicit moral overtone; they elevate the moral stance of crime victims and demonize offenders, crystallizing each identity.
Thus, perhaps most significant, the rights-claims by crime victims produce new kinds of social subjects and identities. “The crime victim” identity lies at the core of the Proposition 9/VBRA’s proponents’ justification for a class of more and harsher punishment; punishment that would presumably allow crime victims to finally enjoy what are apparently absent rights to public safety and state protection against immoral criminals. Moreover, embedded in these claims is a hidden set of assumptions: “victims” as an identity becomes a kind of totalized, perpetual self-righteous identity. The unspoken assumption
Victims’ Rights and Public Safety
is that victims could never themselves victimize others (for example, cause social harm). Additionally proponents’ claim that crime victims deserve “equal rights,” the same rights as offenders, embodies the absurd assumption that prisoners in fact enjoy more rights than free citizens. This is based on the false assumption that because we have a due process system, prisoners have constitutional rights that protect them in ways that ordinary citizens do not; they are part of a “protected” class. Finally, the claim that passage of the VBRA is a matter of “public safety” which the public should not “forfeit” by releasing lifers who are up for parole, assumes that lengthy incarceration makes society safer.
Ironically, it is these very antagonist dichotomies that veil social harms. For constructions such as “innocent victim/guilty criminal” reproduce power relations and hold implicit racial and gendered meaning within the context of ameliorative justice struggles and justice discourse surrounding the Proposition 9/VBRA. In much the same way as the former Bush administration’s ameliorative justice claims about “evil-doers” were used to justify war, Proposition 9 /VBRA advocates’ employment of justice language and rights claims served a purpose far less noble than avenging themselves against individual wrongdoers.
In the following sections, I explore how rights claims by “crime victims,” in conjunction with methodological individualism (or mainstream criminology’s exclusive focus on rectifying or reacting to interpersonal harms) mask social and racial and gender power relations by masquerading as neutral—as merely a matter of adjudication between two otherwise equal actors.
Race and the Inequality of “Equal Rights” (for Victims)
The claim by Mr. Mitch Zak, the Proposition 9/VBRA campaign’s public relations representative, of merely “put[ting] victims on an equal playing field with defendants” is an example of how such liberal concepts of equality disguise the exercise of power. Michalowski (2009) points out that “critical criminology seeks to show where power and domination are obscured behind a veil of ideology.” As Critical Legal Studies (CLS) has shown, under liberal forms of government, law purports to function as neutral but in fact masks power interests and relations. Kimberle Crenshaw (1995:xxv) argues that, whereas the liberal legalist tradition viewed law as a mere mediator of social conflict, critical legal studies revealed how “legal institutions construct social interests and relations” (my emphasis). Commonsense concepts of “victims,” “rights,” “equal protection,” and “the equal playing field,” within the context of the Proposition 9/VBRA campaign, become highly ideological constructs that are far from neutral.
How does ideology function with regard to Proposition 9/The Victims’ Bill of Rights Act? That is,
how do claims to equal rights by crime victims in fact represent a highly ideological position and set of assumptions about “criminals,” “victims,” and “rights” that reproduce race and class domination? To begin with, the VBRA’s ideological character can be uncovered perhaps most obviously in several striking and fundamental contradictions in the logic of this law. First, contrary to the claim by Mr. Zak (2008) that “Proposition 9 is simply about giving more rights to victims…[by putting] the constitutional rights of crime victims on an equal playing field with those of defendants” (my emphasis), this law does more than neutrally “mediate the threat posed by others [where citizens belong to a] community of equals” (Cook 1995:88), as legal formalism holds. Ironically, both sides do not share equal social status to begin with, nor are they equally rights-bearing citizens. The proponents of Proponents of Proposition 9/VBRA are free citizens seeking “equal rights” with prisoners—an explicitly un- free and incarcerated population. Vast social class and racial differences also exist between these two groups.
Second, the Proposition 9/VBRA further subjugates those already incarcerated by undermining their constitutional rights (including the right to counsel, the overriding of the jury decision of life with the possibility of parole, and other rights).8 In this way, what parades as justice— avenging crime victims and punishing criminals- -disguises attempts to deny prisoners their constitutional rights.
Third, the ideological nature of the Proposition 9/VBRA is seen in its deeply flawed overall logic. It places an irrational focus on those inmates (lifers) who are the least likely to be paroled in California in the first place; or if they are by chance paroled, to recidivate.9 In short, the illogic of proponents’ calls for “equal rights with defendants,” the challenge this law poses to prisoners’ constitutional rights, and proponents’ insistence on keeping the least-likely-to-be-paroled group of offenders behind bars for longer, all belie the neutrality of their equal rights-claims.
Law, I am therefore suggesting, does not merely arbitrate interpersonal wrongs between citizens, nor does it delineate “neutral boundaries defining the liberal equality of individuals within a community of equals” (Cook 1995). Rather, in states under liberal forms of government that are marked by class and racial inequality, ameliorative justice necessarily becomes far more than the neutral mediation of conflicts between members of a community of equals. The Proposition 9/Victims’ Bill of Rights Act, through invoking the victim/criminal dichotomy and through its rights claims, masquerades as neutral but in fact demarcates race, gender, and class boundaries.
THE VICTIM IDENTITY One way race, gender, and class boundaries are
maintained is through the very construction of “the crime
Beck/ Western Criminology Review 11(1), 20-36 (2010)
victim” identity and through victims’ claims to rights. At the San Quentin symposium, Proposition 9/VBRA proponents reflected their strong investment in the victim identity. This identity was strengthened through repetition of personal stories of victimization and the details of the crimes committed upon them or their families (which in turn bolstered their demands for ameliorative justice). For example, before the roomful of prisoners, Ms. Belinda Harris-Ritter, an attorney and self-described crime victim, recounted the night an intruder drove onto her family’s property and murdered both of her parents in cold blood. She has repeated this story many times in her victims’ rights advocacy work. Similarly, the effect of the killings on her sisters has also reinforced her identity as a victim. She explained: “My sisters will always have to live with this: it’s affected them to this day,” equating their symptoms to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (Harris-Ritter 2008). The retelling of these stories and horrific events allows these violations to be relived again and again, reinforcing and reifying the victim identity. For example, later that day, the same story was repeated to the CBS Television reporter covering the symposium. Harris-Ritter (2008) said, “I would …
Racial Disparities in Access to and Utilization of Jail- and Community- Based Mental Health Treatment in 8 US Midwestern Jails in 2017 Bethany Joy Hedden, MSW, Erin Comartin, PhD, MSW, Nanci Hambrick, MSW, and Sheryl Kubiak, PhD, MSW
See also Canada, p. 178.
Objectives. To examine the dual disproportionality that individuals with serious mental illness and people
of color (PoC) occupy in the criminal–legal system.
Methods. This study follows a cohort of 623 individuals who screened positive for mental health issues at
booking in 8 Midwestern jails in 2017. We followed individuals through the jails’ practices of jail-based mental
health treatment, and we used Medicaid billing data to assess community-based behavioral health
treatment engagement in the postyear period after jail release. The aim was to examine if an individual’s
race/ethnicity was associated with their access to jail- and community-based mental health treatment.
Results. We did not find any racial disparities in jail-based treatment, although 3 community-based
outcomes significantly differed. Compared with PoC, White people had 1.9 times greater odds of receiving
community-based mental health and substance use treatment and 4.5 times greater odds of receiving
co-occurring disorder treatment.
Conclusions. Barriers that individuals released from jail face adversely affect PoC, resulting in reduced
access to treatment. Critical race theory can expose the assumptions and functions of systems of care and
the possible reproduction of implicit bias in potential solutions. (Am J Public Health. 2021;111:277–285.
By the end of 2016, approximately6.6 million individuals were under community supervision or incarcerated
in the United States; of this population,
about 745 200 were incarcerated in
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