Since the wave of democratic transitionsin the 1980s and 1990s, the advancement of democracy in Latin America has fluctuated, varying by countryand period of time. In light of its history and current situation, is democracy likely to strengthen or weaken over the next decade?
Defend why democracy will strengthen in Latin America over the next decade.
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The Resurgence of the Latin American Left
S T E V E N L E V I T S K Y
K E N N E T H M . R O B E R T S
The Johns Hopkins University Press Baltimore
c o n t e n t s
List of Tables and Figures vii Preface ix
Introduction: Latin America’s “Left Turn”: A Framework for Analysis 1 s t eve n l ev i ts k y a n d k e n n e t h m . ro b e rts
pa rt i t h e m at i c i s s u e s
1 Evidence from Public Opinion 31 j a s o n ro s s a r n o l d a n d d av i d j . s a m u e l s
2 Economic Constraints and Presidential Agency 52 m a r í a v i c to r i a m u r i l lo , v i rg i n i a o l i ve ro s , a n d m i l a n va i s h n av
3 The Left: Destroyer or Savior of the Market Model? 71 k u rt wey l a n d
4 The Political Left, the Export Boom, and the Populist Temptation 93 ro b e rt r. k au f m a n
5 Social Policy and Redistribution: Chile and Uruguay 117 j e n n i f e r p r i b b l e a n d eve ly n e h u b e r
6 The Diversity of Left Party Linkages and Competitive Advantages 139 s a m u e l h a n d l i n a n d ru t h b e r i n s co l l i e r
7 The Left and Participatory Democracy: Brazil, Uruguay, and Venezuela 162 b e n j a m i n g o l d f r a n k
8 The Left and Citizenship Rights 184 d e b o r a h j . ya s h a r
pa rt i i c a s e a n a ly s e s
9 Venezuela: Hugo Chávez and the Populist Left 213 m a rg a r i ta ló pe z m aya
10 Bolivia: Origins and Policies of the Movimiento al Socialismo 239 r aú l m a d r i d
11 Ecuador: Rafael Correa and the Citizens’ Revolution 260 c at h e r i n e m . co n ag h a n
12 Argentina: Left Populism in Comparative Perspective, 2003–2009 283 s e b a s t i á n e tc h e m e n d y a n d c a n d e l a r i a g a r ay
13 Brazil: The PT in Power 306 we n d y h u n t e r
14 Chile: The Left after Neoliberalism 325 k e n n e t h m . ro b e rts
15 Uruguay: A Social Democratic Government in Latin America 348 j o rg e l a n z a ro
16 Peru: The Left Turn That Wasn’t 375 m a x we l l a . c a m e ro n
Conclusion: Democracy, Development, and the Left 399 s t eve n l ev i ts k y a n d k e n n e t h m . ro b e rts
References 429 Contributors 461
i n t r o d u c t i o n
Latin America’s “Left Turn” A Framework for Analysis
s t e v e n l e v i t s k y a n d k e n n e t h m . r o b e r t s
The beginning of the 21st century witnessed an unprecedented wave of electoral victories by leftist presidential candidates in Latin America. The wave began in 1998, when Hugo Chávez, a former paratrooper who had led a failed military uprising six years earlier, was elected president of Venezuela. Chávez was followed in quick succession by Socialist candidate Ricardo Lagos in Chile (2000); ex-metalworker and Workers’ Party (PT) leader Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil (2002); left-of-center Peronist Néstor Kirchner in Argentina (2003); Tabaré Vázquez of the leftist Broad Front (FA) in Uruguay (2004); and coca growers’ union leader Evo Morales of the Movement toward Socialism in Bolivia (2005), the fi rst indigenous president in that country’s history. In 2006, ex–revolutionary leader Daniel Ortega and the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) returned to power in Nicaragua, while independent left-wing economist Rafael Correa won the Ecuadorian presidency.¹ By decade’s end, leftist candidates had also scored improbable victories in Paraguay (ex-Catholic bishop Fernando Lugo) and El Salvador (Mauricio Funes of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front [FMLN], a former guerrilla movement). Incumbent leftist presidents or parties were subsequently reelected in Venezuela (2000, 2006), Chile (2006), Brazil (2006, 2010), Argentina (2007), Ecuador (2009), Bolivia (2009), and Uruguay (2009). By 2009, nearly two-thirds of Latin Americans lived under some form of left-leaning national government. The breadth of this “left turn” was unprec- edented; never before had so many countries in the region entrusted the aff airs of state to leaders associated with the political Left (see table I.1).
The political ascendance of the Left extended beyond these presidential victories. Leftist alternatives emerged or strengthened during the 2000s even in countries where they did not capture the presidency, such as Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and Costa Rica. In Honduras, one of the few remaining countries in the region with no signifi cant leftist party, Manuel Zelaya of the center-right Liberal Party veered left after winning the presidency, eventually provoking a military coup. And crucially, the rise of leftist
2 The Resurgence of the Latin American Left
alternatives was associated with a broadening of social and economic policy options in the region. Unlike the 1980s and 1990s, when candidates often campaigned for offi ce on vague leftist platforms but governed as promarket conservatives (Stokes 2001), the post-1998 wave of leftist victories ushered in a new era of policy experimentation in which governments expanded their developmental, redistributive, and social welfare roles. The “left turn,” therefore, changed not only who governed in Latin America, but also how they governed.
The rise of the Left was a stunning turn of events in a region where political and economic liberalism—buttressed by U.S. hegemony—appeared triumphant at the end of the Cold War. With the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the demise of statist and socialist development models, and the rise of the so-called Washington Consensus around free market or “neoliberal” economic policies (Williamson 1990; Edwards 1995), U.S.-style capitalist democracy appeared to be the only game in town in the 1990s. The debt and infl ationary crises of the 1980s had discredited state-led devel- opment models, while neoliberal reforms deepened Latin America’s integration into global trade and fi nancial circuits, thereby narrowing governments’ policy options. The reform process was directed by technocrats who claimed a mantle of scientifi c
Table I.1. Left governments in Latin America, 1998–2010
Country Party President Year elected
Fifth Republic Movement / United Socialist Party of Venezuela
Chilean Socialist Party (PSCh)
Workers’ Party (PT)
Justicialista Party (PJ)
Broad Front (FA)
Movement toward Socialism (MAS)
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)
Patriotic Alliance for Change
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN)
Ricardo Lagos Michelle Bachelet Luiz Inácio Lula da
Silva Dilma Rousseff Néstor Kirchner, Cristina Fernández de
Kirchner Tabaré Vázquez José Alberto (Pepe)
Mujica Evo Morales
1998; reelected in 2000, 2006
2000 2006 2002; reelected in
2006 2010 2003 2007
2005; reelected in 2009
2006; reelected in 2009
Latin America’s “Left Turn” 3
expertise for free market policies that were backed by the U.S. government, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Stallings 1992; Domínguez 1997). With labor movements in retreat and revolutionary alternatives seemingly foreclosed, historical rivals to liberalism from both populist and leftist traditions ac – cepted market reforms. In the eyes of many observers, then, the Left had “all but vanished” in post–Cold War Latin America (Colburn 2002, 72).
By the late 1990s, however, the neoliberal consensus had begun to unravel. Al- though the free market model succeeded in controlling infl ation, in much of the re gion it was plagued by anemic growth, periodic fi nancial crises, and deepening so cial and economic inequalities. These problems created new opportunities for the mobilization of opposition, some of it channeled into the electoral arena by parties of the Left and some stoking the mass protest movements that toppled promarket governments in Ecuador, Argentina, and Bolivia (Roberts 2008b; Silva 2009).
Latin America’s left turn was far from a uniform experience, however. New left governments varied widely: in Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, institutionalized leftist parties maintained the relatively orthodox macroeconomic policies and liberal demo- cratic constitutions they had inherited from nonleftist predecessors; in Venezuela, however, a populist outsider used plebiscitary means to rewrite the constitutional rules of the game, and he launched a statist and redistributive project that broke sharply with the Washington Consensus. Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Paraguay fell in between these two poles, combining diff erent types of policy and regime orientations in distinct ways.
The central purpose of this volume is to explain these diverse leftist experiments and assess their implications for democracy and development. We explore three main sets of questions. First, we seek to explain the sudden revival of leftist alternatives at the turn of the millennium. Our analysis highlights several common domestic and international factors that fostered the Left’s ascendance—in particular, the institu- tionalization of democratic contestation under conditions of extreme social and eco- nomic inequalities and a relatively permissive international environment.
Second, we map and attempt to explain variation among leftist governments. The Left in Latin America is no longer defi ned by a commitment to a socialist model of development. Instead, its commitments to equality, social justice, and popular par- ticipation produce an open-ended struggle for social transformation that is subject to considerable experimentation and variation. As such, new left governments in the region have pursued diverse agendas. Although all of them are committed to a more equitable growth model, some are more willing than others to break with neoliberal orthodoxy by using state power to regulate markets, alter property relations, and redistribute income. Likewise, they vary in their willingness to work within preexist- ing liberal democratic institutions and in their commitments to popular participa-
4 The Resurgence of the Latin American Left
tion. This volume thus seeks to identify and explain the variation in policy and regime orientations among left governments. Our analysis suggests that the diff erent types of left government in contemporary Latin America are rooted in distinct historical experiences and pathways to political power. These historical paths shaped left parties’ organizational characteristics, societal linkages, positions within party systems, and, ultimately, their approaches to policy reform and democratic governance.
Third, we evaluate the implications of the “left turn” for development and democ- racy in Latin America. The revival of the Left has placed the “big questions” back on the political agenda, belying the notion that the region had reached the “end of poli- tics” (Colburn 2002) in the 1990s. Are new left governments crafting viable alterna- tives to the neoliberal model of capitalism that swept across the region in the wake of the Debt Crisis? What are the boundaries of policy experimentation in a global econ- omy that is structured and disciplined by mobile capital? Has the revival of the Left enhanced the quality of democracy by incorporating previously excluded groups and creating opportunities for grassroots participation? Has it contributed to the consoli- dation of liberal democracy or generated potentially destabilizing forms of social po- larization and power concentration that undermine institutional checks and balances? Since the answers to these questions vary across cases, a comparative perspective is essential for understanding the broader implications of Latin America’s “left turn.”
What’s “Left” in Contemporary Latin America?
Before proceeding to these larger questions, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by “the Left.” This is no easy task. Historically, the Latin American Left was conceived in ideological terms as movements of socialist, and particularly Marxist, inspiration. The Left was associated with a relatively well-defi ned alternative to capitalist models of development, one that emphasized public ownership of the means of production and central planning as opposed to market allocation of basic goods and services. Diff er- ences within the Left were largely strategic, related to the choice between revolution- ary and democratic paths to socialism. By the 1980s, however, the crisis of Marxism as an ideological referent and of socialism as a development model compelled the Left to redefi ne itself (Castañeda 1993). Many leftists began to conceive of their project as an open-ended process of social transformation—one of “deepening” democracy— rather than a predetermined endpoint (see Garretón 1987; Roberts 1998). In terms of public policy, leftist platforms grew more moderate and ambiguous as historically left-of-center parties that won national power almost invariably watered down or abandoned their preexisting platforms.² Many, in fact, felt obliged to adopt neoliberal stabilization and adjustment policies. Those that remained in opposition, such as the PT in Brazil and FA in Uruguay, often maintained a more leftist profi le, although this
Latin America’s “Left Turn” 5
tended to be based on little more than a rejection of neoliberalism. At the beginning of the 2000s, then, “What’s Left?” remained an open question in Latin America, in terms of both programmatic content and the identity of political actors.
For the purposes of this study, the Left refers to political actors who seek, as a central programmatic objective, to reduce social and economic inequalities. Left parties seek to use public authority to redistribute wealth and/or income to lower-income groups, erode social hierarchies, and strengthen the voice of disadvantaged groups in the political process. In the socioeconomic arena, left policies aim to combat inequali- ties rooted in market competition and concentrated property ownership, enhance opportunities for the poor, and provide social protection against market insecuri- ties. Although the contemporary Left does not necessarily oppose private property or market competition, it rejects the idea that unregulated market forces can be relied on to meet social needs (see Arnson 2007; French 2009). In the political realm, the Left seeks to enhance the participation of underprivileged groups and erode hier- archical forms of domination that marginalize popular sectors. Historically, the Left has focused on class diff erences, but many contemporary Left parties have broadened this focus to include inequalities rooted in gender, race, or ethnicity—although, as Deborah Yashar notes in chapter 8, the Latin American Left has been slow to address these non-class-based inequalities.
Given the shifting ideological terrain after the Cold War and the diversity of ex- isting left projects, our defi nition is necessarily broad (see also Panizza 2005b, 729; and Cleary 2006, 36). Like the political reality it depicts, it does not produce neat boundaries. Because some of its attributes refer to gradations rather than categorical distinctions, partial or intermediate cases inevitably exist. Indeed, one fi nds consid- erable debate over whether politicians such as Néstor Kirchner (Argentina), Lucio Gutiérrez (Ecuador), Álvaro Colom (Guatemala), and Ollanta Humala (Peru) should be considered part of the Left. In general, we argue that what distinguishes left from nonleft forces is the programmatic centrality of redistributive policies. Although other political forces (e.g., many Christian Democratic parties) may support limited redistributive or social protection policies not unlike those championed by the Left, only left parties place redistribution and social equality (as opposed to simply “help- ing the poor”) at the top of their programmatic agenda.
We treat as left governments only those parties and politicians that retain mean- ingful aspects of their platform while in offi ce. Thus, historically left-of-center parties that largely abandon their redistributive commitments (e.g., the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance [APRA] in contemporary Peru) or politicians who campaign on the left but govern on the right after winning the presidency (e.g., Lucio Gutiérrez in Ecuador) are not considered leftist.
6 The Resurgence of the Latin American Left
Populism and the Left
Our conceptualization should help to clarify the relationship between the Left and populism in Latin America. Populism is a notoriously elastic and contested concept (Roberts 1995; Weyland 2001). In contrast to those who defi ne populism in terms of economic policy (Dornbusch and Edwards 1990, 1991), we treat it as a political phenomenon (see Weyland 2001). We defi ne populism as the top-down political mo- bilization of mass constituencies by personalistic leaders who challenge established political or economic elites on behalf of an ill-defi ned pueblo, or “the people.” Al- though populists appeal to the poor against an established elite, often including the economic elite, these appeals need not be left of center. Indeed, the programmatic content of populist appeals has varied considerably across cases and over time. During the 1930s and 1940s, Latin American populism was associated with the nationalistic, state-led development model known as import substitution industrialization (ISI), as well as a variety of redistributive and social welfare measures. Advocates of a “third way” between capitalism and socialism, many of these classical populists constructed corporatist channels of interest intermediation that provided material benefi ts for labor (and sometimes peasant) movements in exchange for political loyalty (Collier and Collier 1991).
During the 1990s, Latin American populism often took a more right-wing—and even neoliberal—form, as outsiders appealed to the (often disorganized and urban informal) poor against a political and economic elite that was associated with the ISI state (Roberts 1995; Weyland 1996, 1999a). Presidents Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil, Alberto Fujimori in Peru, and, more recently, Álvaro Uribe in Colombia can hardly be described as leftist. Indeed, all of them carried out neoliberal economic policies. Yet they clearly had populist tendencies, in that they made unmediated mass appeals in opposition to the political establishment. Rather than attacking economic oligarchies, right-wing populists condemned what they characterized as a corrupt and exclusionary political class; and rather than promising to redistribute wealth, they off ered economic stability and/or physical security.
Unlike the Left, then, populism should not be defi ned in programmatic or ideo- logical terms. It is defi ned instead along a separate dimension related to patterns of political mobilization or modes of linkage between leaders and mass constituencies (see Ostiguy forthcoming). Leftist politics can be found at both the populist and the nonpopulist ends of this spectrum. Leftist leaders who subordinate or bypass partisan intermediaries to appeal directly to mass constituencies—for example, Hugo Chávez and Rafael Correa—may be considered populist. However, leftist leaders who emerge from and remain accountable to autonomous social movements, such as Evo Morales,³ or institutionalized bases of partisan support, such as Lula, Ricardo Lagos,
Latin America’s “Left Turn” 7
or Tabaré Vázquez, are not. Similarly, populist leaders may be located on the left when they challenge the prerogatives of capital and redistribute income toward the poor, as in the case of Lázaro Cárdenas in the 1930s or Chávez in the 2000s. However, popu- lists whose appeals center on nonredistributive issues such as nationalism, nativism, public order, or simply a rejection of the political establishment are often closer to the ideological Right. For this reason, populist fi gures such as Juan Perón (and, more recently, Ollanta Humala) are not easily located along the conventional left-right spectrum. Indeed, they frequently draw support from both ends of the ideological continuum (see Ostiguy forthcoming).
The revival of leftist and populist alternatives in Latin America may be rooted in similar kinds of social strains, but the two phenomena are not synonymous. Neither is the latter a subset of the former. They are analytically distinct phenomena that sometimes overlap but often exist in tension with each other. What must be asked, then, is why they returned to political prominence at the turn of the century after having been relegated by scholars to the dustbins of history in the early 1990s.
Explaining Latin America’s “Left Turn”
Like the “Third Wave” of democratization (Huntington 1991), the resurgence of the Latin American Left has no single cause (see, e.g., Barrett, Chávez, and Rodríguez- Garavito 2008). Rather, it is rooted in multiple factors, some of which are long-term and structural, while others are short-term and contingent. Moreover, the relative weight of these factors shifted over the course of the 1998–2010 period. In this section, we break down the explanation into three parts: (1) long-term structural factors that facilitated but did not directly cause the left turn; (2) historically contingent factors, especially macroeconomic conditions, that triggered the initial wave of left victories; and (3) changing environmental conditions that helped deepen and extend the wave in the mid and late 2000s.
Long-Term Causes: Inequality and the Institutionalization of Electoral Competition
Two long-term factors underlie the Left’s resurgence in Latin America. One is inequal- ity: despite economic stabilization and the resumption of growth in the 1990s, Latin America remained plagued by severe poverty, inequality, and social exclusion at the dawn of the 21st century. In 2002, 221 million Latin Americans—44 of the regional population—lived in poverty (ECLAC 2004, 6), and income distribution in the region was the most unequal in the world. Poverty and inequality do not inevita- bly translate into left political success; conservative parties have often built political
8 The Resurgence of the Latin American Left
loyalties among the poor through patron-clientelism, religious identities, and varied appeals to growth, order, and security. Nevertheless, poverty and inequality do cre- ate a potential constituency for the Left: a large pool of voters who are likely to be receptive to redistributive appeals (see also Cleary 2006, 37). The credibility of these appeals was undermined in the 1980s and 1990s, when the combination of infl ation- ary pressures, fi scal crisis, weakened labor unions, and ideological disarray put the Left on the defensive. By the end of the 1990s, however, the failure of states under liberalized economies to respond to social needs allowed left parties and movements to “re-politicize” inequality (Roberts 2008b; Luna and Filgueira 2009) and place redistributive policies back on the political agenda.
A second condition that facilitated the Left’s ascendance was the institutionaliza- tion of electoral competition (Castañeda 2006; Cleary 2006). Throughout much of Latin American history, leftist movements were denied an opportunity to contest power legally, fi rst via restricted suff rage and later through mechanisms such as mili- tary intervention, proscription, and repression. The emergence in the early 20th cen- tury of Marxist and other radical movements seeking to transform property relations led elites to perceive left parties, even moderate ones, as a threat to the socioeconomic order. Polarization deepened during the Cold War, as left movements’ real or per- ceived ties to the Soviet bloc led Washington to view them as a potential threat to U.S. security interests. In the name of anticommunism, left-of-center parties were often banned, repressed, or—when they made it into power—toppled by military coups, often with backing from the United States (e.g., Guatemala in 1954; the Dominican Republic, 1963; Brazil, 1964; Chile, 1973). During the 1970s and early 1980s, then, military repression inhibited leftist political participation in much of Latin America (O’Donnell 1973; Collier 1979), leaving a legacy of organizational weakness and fear on the Left that endured well after democratization.
The geopolitical environment had changed markedly by the 1990s, however, fol- lowing the democratic transitions of the 1980s and the collapse of the Soviet bloc. Revolutionary alternatives largely disappeared, leaving much of the Latin American Left to embrace liberal democracy and accept the core features of capitalism, thus diminishing elite perceptions of the threat posed by leftist governments (Castañeda 1993). As left governments ceased to be perceived as a security threat, U.S. support for authoritarian alternatives waned, and military intervention sharply declined.⁴ Democratic regimes consolidated in the Southern Cone and Brazil, and even where they remained weak and crisis-ridden, as in much of Central America and the Andes, electoral politics persisted. For the fi rst time in history, then, left parties could openly organize and compete for power throughout Latin America (paradoxically, except for Cuba).
Leftist parties took advantage of this opening throughout the region. Even at the
Latin America’s “Left Turn” 9
height of the Washington Consensus in the 1990s, new left-of-center parties made signifi cant gains in Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Mexico, Uruguay, Venezuela, and else- where. These advances were particularly striking at the local level—where, as Benja- min Goldfrank suggests in chapter 7, the “left turn” really began—as leftist mayors were elected in Brasília, São Paulo, San Salvador, Mexico City, Montevideo, and Caracas. Control of municipal governments gave left parties an opportunity to solid- ify their organizations and support bases, gain experience, and establish reputations for administrative competence (Chávez and Goldfrank 2004).
In sum, social inequality and the institutionalization of electoral competition were crucial “permissive” causes of the “left turn” (Cleary 2009, 7). Persistent inequality created a large potential constituency for the Left that could be mobilized around claims for redistribution and expanded social citizenship. Stable democracy, mean- while, allowed left parties to articulate social grievances and compete for elected offi ce on a platform calling for social and economic change. The intersection of these two long-term structural and institutional conditions allowed the Left to overcome its post–Cold War crisis and regain the political off ensive by the end of the 1990s.
Neoliberalism and Economic Crisis
Inequality and democracy cannot explain the timing of the left turn, however. The initial wave of leftist victories at the turn of the century was rooted in two key eco- nomic developments: the market-oriented reforms of the 1980s and 1990s and the 1998–2002 economic crisis. The left turn is commonly viewed as a backlash against neoliberal reforms,⁵ as the unleashing of market forces exacerbated economic hard- ship and insecurity for many Latin Americans and the withdrawal of states from key areas of social protection eroded their ability to meet social demands. Indeed, levels of social inequality increased throughout much of Latin America during the 1990s (Huber and Solt 2004).
Yet it was not necessarily neoliberalism per se that drove voters to the Left.⁶ There is little evidence of widespread public opposition to market-oriented policies during the 1990s; although privatization policies faced signifi cant opposition, other elements of the Washington Consensus, such as free trade and foreign investment, enjoyed broad public support (Armijo and Faucher 2002; Baker 2003, 2008). Moreover, where neoliberal reformers were deemed to perform well—in particular, where they stabi- lized hyperinfl ationary economies—they were often reelected.⁷
The 1998–2002 economic downturn is thus critical to explaining the initial wave of left victories in Latin America. After experiencing modest growth between 1990 and 1997, most Latin American economies stagnated or sank into recession in the late 1990s. As a whole, Latin America experienced negative per capita growth between
10 The Resurgence of the Latin American Left
1998 and 2002, and poverty and unemployment rates increased throughout the region (ECLAC 2003). By 2002, 60 of families in the region reported that an adult …
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Peter H. Smith Melissa R. Ziegler
This article examines the incidence of liberal and “illiberal” democracy in Latin America from 1978 through 2004. It demonstrates, first, that illiberal democracy—which combines free and fair elections with sys- tematic constraints on citizens
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